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We like to believe that our knowledge increases with the passage
of time. Still, there is probably less truth in this than we care to
admit, even to ourselves. Certainly our vocabulary has become more
complex as our technology has grown. And, concomitantly, we
tend to accept the proposition that the proliferation of the lexicon
reflects some expansion in knowledge. Unfortunately, though, this
has a good deal of truth in it only as it concerns the natural sciences;
there is less reason to believe it is true elsewhere. In the social
sciences and the law, for instance, we think we have gained much of
what we believe is knowledge, but the validity of it or even the use-
fulness of it remains to be seen.
In academic circles, this inflation of words, concepts, and labels
is linked (at least partially) with the steady development of more
and more schools of thought and research in the various disciplines
and professions. Moreover, there has come to be a good deal of
interdisciplinary and interprofessional interaction in Academia, and
the law schools and the social sciences are no exception to the rule.
For example, as the social sciences have come into their own over the
last several decades, this has been reflected by newer conceptualiza-
tions that have come to be attached to various schools of thought
in law circles. As sociology developed, for instance, legal or judicial
realism became associated with research and thinking characterized
as sociological jurisprudence or the sociology of law. Subsequently,
as the socal sciences began emphasizing the refinement of their
methods and techniques, jurisprudence came into some associa-
tion with what is now called "jurimetrics."' Recently, as the de-
velopment of the judicial behavioral movement in political science
*Adapted from a paper presented at the national convention of the
American Association of Law Schools, Washington, D.C. on December 28,
1966.
tProfessor of Political Science, University of Hawaii.
1 See Jurivnetrics, 1 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 28 (1963).
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reached the point of birth, Martin Shapiro of the Stanford Univer-
sity Department of Political Science took it upon himself to baptize
the emergent infant as "political jurisprudence."2 But Shapiro is
neither a lawyer nor a law professor-he is a political scientist. And
as far as I know, "political jurisprudence" has not yet found itself
adopted by legal educational circles. The law is, in this case, hardly
a jealous master.
Perhaps out of its so-called traditional conservatism or perhaps
because of a crassness implied in the new name, the law schools have
been (by and large) reluctant to admit to a siring of young "po-
litical jurisprudence." So I propose to change its name to one more
descriptive of the theory and the methods composing the school of
thought-"political scientific jurisprudence." It isn't very euphoni-
ous, but it is more accurate. Of course, new garb does not legitimize
a bastard nor does it serve to convince a dubious father of its pa-
ternity. Adoption implies an acceptance of certain responsibilities.
And one does not accept such responsibilities lightly. Thus this
article, besides changing labels, is designed to persuade. In it, I
intend to explicate and elaborate on that which Shapiro has already
discussed. I also intend to survey and supplement the field of po-
litical scientific jurisprudence. For by doing this I think it will
become clear that this newest of the social scientific perspectives (em-
pirical and "normative") of the courts and law deserves a prominent
place in the law school curriculum (being implicit in even the "bread
and butter" course work). In other words, by ignoring its natural
child, the law school has been neglecting its family.
The relationship between political science, political theory, the
sociology of law, and jurisprudence has been well stated by Shapiro
on several occasions. In coining the phrase "political jurisprudence"
he stated:
Political jurisprudence is in one sense an attempt to advance
sociological jurisprudence by greater specialization. It seeks to
overcome the rather nebulous and over general propositions of
the earlier movement by concentrating on the specifically po-
litical aspects of law's interaction with society and describing the
concrete impact of legal arrangements on the distribution of power
and rewards among the various elements in a given society ....
Moreover, the new jurisprudence shares with all modern Amer-
ican thinking about law, the premise that judges make rather
'Shapiro, Political Jurispridence, 52 Ky. L.J. 294 (1964).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
than simply discover law. Without this premise there could be
no political jurisprudence, for one of the central concerns of
politics is power and power implies choice . . . 'Political' can
only be linked with 'jurisprudence' when it is realized that
choices inhere in those phases of human endeavor that have
traditionally been the object of jurisprudence study.3
It is hardly surprising that legal realism has led to this. Ex-
trapolating from the writings of Holmes, Cardozo, Pound, Frank
and Llewellyn, among others, it should amaze no one that political
scientists would come to see the courts as political agencies. It should
come as no surprise that political scientists would begin to develop
theory that would attempt to explain and evaluate the behavior of
judges and courts from a political context.
Political science's traditional counterpart to the law school has
been a subfield called "public law." Up to quite recently, this has
amounted to little more than legal analysis of case opinions, consti-
tutional history, and structural descriptions of the American ju-
dicial system. But early in the 1950's a revolution that had been
long in forming in political science finally gained a strong foothold.'
The new revolutionaries came to be known as "political behavioral-
ists."5 In fact, they were simply political scientists who desired to
apply social scientific theory and methods to the study of political
phenomena. Now that revolution has succeeded-insofar as be-
havioralists now compose a substantial segment of the political
science discipline.' Nonetheless, one of the last fields to feel a sub-
stantial impact of this revolt was public law. For although there
were some early forays into the public law bastion,7 the major as-
"Id. at 294-5.
'The forerunners to what is now called the "political behavior" move-
ment were Charles Merriam, Harold Gosnell and Harold Lasswell of the
University of Chicago school of the late 1920's. Merriam is undoubtedly
the father and Lasswell the prodigal (and prodigious) son. Some people
say, if one book should be singled out as the "first," it would be: LASSWELL,
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS (1930).
'Some feel that the forerunner and most directly seminal book of the
behavioral movement is EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (1953). EASTON,
FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1964) is of similar effect and
contains a very good definition of "political behavioralism" in the first
chapter.
Dahl, The Behavioral Approach of Political Science: Epitaph for a
Monument to a Successfid Protest, 55 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 763 (1961).
'E.g., PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1955);
PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948); ROSENBLUM, LAW AS A PO-
LITICAL INSTRUMENT (1955).
[Vol. 45
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sault was delayed until a book by Schubert in 1959 provided a
breach.8 The earlier works of Pritchett, Rosenblum and Peltason
provided a theoretical inroad while the approaches outlined by
Schubert became the basis for a large number of subsequent studies.
However, many of these studies were emulative of Schubert's work
up until recently and by and large characterized the political science
"judicial behavioral movement" to political scientists as well as to
others. But today there is a rapidly widening study of the courts by
political scientists-the survey questionnaire is coming into ever
greater use and far more sophisticated theories are being put to test.
Perhaps the most familiar political behavioral focus on courts
and law to the legal scholar (particularly those who teach courses
in what might be called "modern jurisprudence") is that on the
judicial decision-making process. The principal question posed is:
what factors account foi patterns of decisions made by judges-or
by a court or by courts? The political bchavioralists have used many
different statistical techniques and approaches and methods to de-
scribe such patterns accordingly and to explain them particularly
as they might occur in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Partial explanations afforded thusfar have been: the social back-
ground of the judge,' 0 political party preferences," the attitudes
of the judges,'" judicial values and ideologies,'" the clarity of prec-
edent,'4 judicial personality,'5 the homeostatic tendencies of courts
as a small group,' and the perception of role by the Chief Justice."
These are but a few. But as far as theory goes, legal scholars have
'SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959).
'The footnotes contained in Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.J.
294 (1964) contain a fairly complete bibliography of the work in the ju-
dicial behavior movement up to late 1964.
'oSCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT, ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIEs,
AND PROCEDURES (1960).
" Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges Decisions, 55 Am. POL.
Sc. REv. 843 (1961).
1 Spaeth, Unidimensionality and Item Invariance in Judicial Scaling,
10 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 290 (1965).
" SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965); Schubert, Jackson's Ju-
dicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis, 59 Am. POL. Sci. REV.
940 (1965).
"'BECKER, POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 9
(1964).
16 SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965).
'
6
ULMER, INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1960).
' Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process
of the Supreme Court, in COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 497 (Murphy &
Pritchett ed. 1961).
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been prone to shrug all of this off with a "So what, we knew that
before." In all candor, the "new" theories of the political behavior-
alists have added little to the store of knowledge already held by the
jurisprudents. The new studies have been highly jargonated,
crammed with barely understandable technology, and unable to
explain how these various elements or factors actually interacted
under varying conditions. And this last mentioned point, if anything,
is what they had to promise in order to gain any sympathy from
legal scholars who already knew what the factors were. In addition
to this, the assumption of the theory and of the methods used has
been, on the whole, anti-judicial.
On the other hand, the statistical analysis of cases which might
yield legal factors enabling practitioners to predict case outcomes
more precisely did, and still does, interest the law schools and the
legal profession-but only from the standpoint of making "the law
more certain" and getting at cases faster."' But, it should be clear
enough, there is little in this that is political in nature (barring, of
course, the politics of judicial reform). By and large, as far as most
law schools are concerned, "political jurisprudence" or "political
scientific jurisprudence" can only serve this limited purpose. But
this type of case quantification may be best described as brute
empiricism-it is not related to anything-it is simply the quantifi-
cation of past events in order to predict similar future ones. There
is no pretense made to understand any theory, i.e., cause and effect
relationships. Yet, ironically enough, this material would find itself
relegated to courses in jurisprudence--as a part thereof-or to
sociological jurisprudence courses (as a part thereof) or to a seminar
in decision-making (as a part thereof) which are all grounded in
theory. And frankly, since this has been a large part of the political
science contribution thus far, the law schools have been wise in
giving it little visibility. But there are certain movements in the
development of political scientific jurisprudence that warrant a new
" Nagel is probably the best known political scientist in this area. Three
recent articles on this are: Nagel, Applying Correlation Analysis to Case
Prediction, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 1006 (1964); Nagel, Judicial Prediction and
Analysis from Empirical Probability Tables, 41 INnx L.J. 403 (1966);
Nagel, Predicting Court Cases Quantitatively, 63 Mica. L. Rxv. 1411 (1965).
One's attention should be drawn to the fact that the jury Verdict Research
Service of Cleveland now compiles empirical probability tables for lawyers
to help them calculate their chances at trial. But Nagel notes that, "[t]he
use of quantitative prediction of court cases plus traditional prediction
techniques is probably better than the use of the latter alone." Id. at 1422.
[Vol. 45
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look and a different and more prominent treatment by jurists and
jurisprudents as well. For there is a rapidly widening study of the
courts by political scientists in both the methods employed and a
theoretical re-orientation to a judicial perspective. The remainder
of this article will be devoted to demonstrating that this is true.
Shapiro noted, and I think quite correctly, that the major as-
sumption of political scientific jurisprudence has been that courts are
political in nature. The general political science theory that holds
this to be particularly true about the American system begins most
conspicuously with Madison and runs through the likes of de Toc-
queville and Brooks Adams. The more modern institutional-process
type of political scientist who has followed their lead, has seen fit
to stress the likenesses between courts and other political agencies
and judges and other governmental decision-makers. An extreme
along these lines, but a view which has received more than a little
support from political scientists, is Peltason's: ". . . to recognize
that judges participate in the political process as legislators do, is
not to assert that judges necessarily represent the same interests as
legislators or that the consequences of judicial representation are
the same as the consequences of legislative representation."' 9 This
kind of emphasis and rhetoric has been highly unpalatable to legal
scholars and has made the political science stress on politics seem
far greater than I believe it was meant to be. In addition to this
type of theorizing and conceptualization, that of the more statistically
oriented political scientists also is capable of leading legal scholars
into believing that there is little concern for the judicial aspects of
political studies of courts. Some of the statements by judicial be-
havioralists over the last several years have been, to say the least,
beyond the limits of the case that their own research could possibly
support. For instance, we find Schubert stating that this research
has "debunked" the judicial process2" and Spaeth claiming that all
of judicial decision-making is reducible to a set of "attitudes."'"
Clearly, this intemperateness was no more likely to endear this theory
1 9 P.LTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 5 (1955).
(Emphasis added.)
"G Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of
the United States Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 100 (1963).
Therein, id. at 104, Schubert stated that judicial behavioral research had
"debunked legal principles as factors controlling decisions"--which, of
course, it had not done.
21 Spaeth, Unidimensionality and Item Invariance in Judicial Scaling, 10
BErAVIORAL SCIENCE 290 (1965).
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or the methodology to legal scholars than that used by Rodell in
stating that the law was a "high class racket." 22 In short, there has
been enough said by political scientists to reinforce deeply held
suspicions among jurisprudents and other legal scholars that the
political scientists fail to see courts as anything other than political
agencies, and fail to see judges as anything other than political
decision-making units. In other words, legal circles could only see
this material as political theory (and strictly empirical, non-norma-
tive theory at that). It has been perceived as being only tangentially
related to the study of courts, law and jurisprudence. But this
perspective is due to confusing the emphasis and zeal of a new, hotly
opposed minority with the very fiber of a lasting, successful move-
ment-and its process of growth. For the .theoretical and methodo-
logical trend in the political science judicial behavior and judicial
process movements is to describe, examine and analyze peculiarly
legal and judicial aspects of the political process.
For instance, one of the major emphases of the second wave of
political-judicial behavioral work is on judicial role. The stress is
to find out what it is, not what it is not. Surely this is not new
subject matter to the men of jurisprudence. But, on the other hand,
through administering interview schedules and questionnaires to
judiciaries, the political behavioralists can do something more than
simply "systematize and confirm the insights of judicial realism
through techniques borrowed from the social sciences." They can
find out quite precisely what factors judges themselves think are
important, and how this might relate to decisions. One type of
hypothesis which was tested recently and found to resist discon-
firmation was: "Judges who do not consider clear, directly relevant
precedent to be either solely the most or modally a most influential
factor (in contrast to 'common sense,' 'what the public needs,' 'what
the public demands,' 'justice') are more likely to decide subjectively
than judges who do not."'24 Vines is currently at work on an ex-
tensive study of the Supreme Courts of four states and received
almost unanimous cooperation from the justices in his exploration
of their concepts of decision-making role.25
2 RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAwYERS 15 (1939).
" Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 KY L.J. 294, 309 (1964).
" Becker, A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions
of Judicial Role Variation, 60 Am. POL. Sci. Rv. 677, 679 (1966).
"5Judicial cooperation has been extraordinary for modem social scien-
tific judicial role studies. Eighty-seven per cent of the Hawaiian judiciary
[Vol. 45
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Legal realists have long .believed that many factors are present
in the judicial decision, but they have never clearly posited the pre-
cise interaction patterns. This can now be done and it is indicative of
the complementary nature between legal realism and political scien-
tific jurisprudence. Moreover, several other political scientists are
currently exploring the relationship between public attitudes toward
judges and courts (which they are measuring) and various aspects
of judicial behavior.' This too, though mentioned in traditional
legal realist jurisprudential literature, is incapable of intensive study
without the use of various political scientific theories and polling
methods (which are adaptations of other social scientific methods),
and is also indicative of the complementary nature of these two fields
of jurisprudence.
In addition to these research perspectives, political scientists like
Murphy and Danelski are currently attempting to apply behavioral
scientific theories to the study of the United States Supreme Court.
Their approaches are based upon the structural peculiarities of the
court. Murphy has formulated an interesting set of strategic and
tactical propositions about Supreme Court decision-making which
is incredibly sensitive to the multiplicity of roles a justice must play
-as a justice of the supreme court, not as a politician.17 And Danel-
ski is currently sifting through much data from judicial notes, memos,
diaries, etc., in an effort to assess the degree to which modem ref-
erence-group theory can illuminate judicial decision-making in the
United States Supreme Court.
The political science approach, then, in its data, methods, its
current leanings and theories is coming closer to that which is the
scope of concern of judges and legal scholars in general-and to
jurisprudence in particular as it is concerned with the judicial de-
cision-making process. But this is equally true in other substantive
areas as well.
was most receptive to my very lengthy and complex questionnaire. But
Kenneth Vines has done even better. See Becker, Surveys and Judiciaries,
or Who's Afraid of the Purple Curtain?, 1 LAw & Soc. REv. (Fall 1966).
Also Gene Mason of the University of Kentucky and Joel Grossman of the
University of Wisconsin (both political scientists) are currently at work
on judicial role studies and Professor Richard Johnston (of LSU) is at
work in trying to replicate my Hawaiian data.
" Political scientists Joseph Tanenhaus of the University of Iowa and
Walter Murphy of Princeton are embarked on a wide study of American
attitudes towards the courts. The study is sponsored by the National Science
Foundation.
URPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
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Law schools and legal scholars traditionally have accepted the
judicial hierarchy as it formally represents itself. Law schools have
concentrated attention upon judicial hierarchy as it is used on-
the-way-up, i.e., on the right and strategy of appeal. But there does
not seem to have been much interest in the politics of hierarchy
(federal and/or state) or in politico-legal theories studying cases
on-the-way-down and into enforcement, deference and compliance.
Once a case is decided, or leaves the court system, the law school
appears to feel little more than a compulsion to yawn. But surely,
whether from the viewpoint of prospective attorneys or philosophers
of the law, it is important to know what actual interactions exist
among members of the judiciary at different levels or between judges
and other political actors and how this interaction is related to other
political decision-makers. "Probably the most pressing of all the
tasks of political jurisprudence is the development of a systematic
description and analysis of the relation between lower and higher
appellate courts in terms of power, influence and differentiation of
function."2 For what affects judges (whether it be other judges,
congressmen, etc.) affects the living law, and what affects the law
is of substantial importance to modern jurisprudence. And it is here
that significant strides have begun to be made by practitioners of
political scientific jurisprudence. It is this type of material, in fact,
that is directly related to that called for by Professor Miller of the
George Washington Law School: ". . adequate legal criticism, at
the barest minimum, must look to the consequences of law and of
judicial decisions .... .29
Peltason, for one, conducted an exhaustive study of the federal
circuit and district courts in the South in the execution of the will of
the Supreme Court on school integration.3 From this pioneering
work, one can readily derive the proposition that when the Supreme
Court's prescriptive verbiage is highly ambiguous ("with all de-
liberate speed"), under conditions of great political and social pres-
sures, circuit court judges are far more likely to adhere to the spirit
of the Court's mandate than judges in the district courts."' In a
8 Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.J. 294, 319 (1964).
" Miller, On the Need for Impact Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions,
53 GEo. L.J. 365, 368 (1965).
" PELTASON, FIFtY EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961).
"1However, of course, this is not to say that the lower courts have not
also been put to the votes-political attitudes studies of judicial behavioral-
ism. See Goldman, Voting Behavior of the United States Courts of Appeals,
1961-64, 60 Ams. Po. Sci. REv. 374 (1966). On the other hand, in just
[Vol. 45
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sense, then, in order to insulate the local judge against the heat of
local pressures, the mandate must be clear. Surely lawyers and
judges interested in actual application of a higher court decision,
rather than simply in the formal, verbal outcome of a supreme court
decision (federal or state), must be concerned with what will maxi-
mize the chances of an accurate carrying out of that decision by the
lower courts. Is this type of study unrelated to law school concerns?
Legal strategies are based on such stuff, and legal strategies are not
without manifestation in legal briefs.
Another example of such work in contemporary political scien-
tific jurisprudential study is Shapiro's hypothesizing on circuit court
specialization. He asks "To what extent does specialization and the
resultant expertise of certain circuit courts cause them to adopt dif-
ferent views than their more generalized counterparts and resist
or seize policy leadership from the Supreme Court in those areas that
especially interest them?' ' 2 Should this be ignored in law school?
Murphy on the other hand is interested in applying modem or-
ganizational theory to the study of judicial hierarchical relations-
so he is in the process of determining the type of personal relations
that exist between judges at varying court levels. Such relations
may be either positive or negative-each having potentially signifi-
cant impact on the determination of which cases are to be heard and
of their outcomes. For it seems true enough that: "As in all or-
ganizations, there is a danger in the judicial process of conflict not
only between the formal strata of authority but also between formal
and informal hierarchies."-" But political science has not turned its
sociological eye solely to the impact of intra-judicial relations upon
the law and its applications at lower levels, for it is now well on its
way towards an initial theorization of the impact of judicial decisions
on other political decision-makers.
For instance, in the last several years, political science has turned
describing the voting patterns systematically and rigorously (without any
inferences as to attitudes, personality, and the like), we do learn that "The
eleven United States Courts of Appeals, as we have seen, differ in their
rates of dissension and intracircuit conflict as well as the sources of ju-
dicial conflict." Id. at 382. Cf. Vines, Federal District Judges and Race
Relations cases in the South, 26 J. POL. 337 (1964). Goldman's footnotes
are an excellent bibliography for all political science work done on the
lower courts to the middle of 1966.
8 Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.J. 294, 319 (1964).
" MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 121 (1964). See also,
ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCEsS 297-98 (1962).
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its newly acquired social scientific skills towards analyzing the degree
to which local political figures really agree with and implement (or
fail to implement) Supreme Court decisions, e.g., on school prayers
(county school supervisors) , 4 or on illegally obtained evidence
(police chiefs)."' In the latter study, for instance, a political scien-
tist demonstrated that an increase in police education on the holding
of the Mapp case correlated strongly with an increase in police
actions in accord with Mapp (+.56). Another political scientist
recently content analyzed the floor debates in Congress to test legis-
lative invocation of judicial/court symbols (using the prestige of
the court to protect the court from its detractors) in order to see if
such a tactic was effectual in stemming anti-court tides. 6 He found
no such relationship. Nevertheless, this study is an excellent ex-
ample of the new type of methodology in political science's arsenal
being put to use in studying the growing field of legislative-judicial
interaction.37 The field of the impact of judicial decisions on politics
is growing rapidly enough for political scientist Samuel Krislov to
have ventured forth with a working theory:
[W] e may say that in any policy hierarchy general statements of
intent are transmitted downward and are intended to be obeyed.
Subordinates accept and obey such statements-assuming first
they can understand the message-for a variety of reasons.
They may implement the policy they agree with or reap ad-
vantage from it. On the other hand, even if they have reasons to
oppose the policy, they may be moved to support it because of
practical considerations, including the costs of opposition ...
We can therefore distinguish several areas of possible motivations
for compliance-personal utilities, organizational utilities, and
psychological utilities-and can create a matrix or possibilities of
combinations of advantages and disadvantages. .... 3s
" Sorauf, Zorach v. Clason: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision,
53 Amd. POL. Sci. REv. 777 (1959).
"Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence,
1965 Wis. L. REv. 283.
" Stumpf, The Political Efficacy of Judicial Sumbolism, 19 W. PoL. Q.
293 (1966).
MU'PHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURr (1961); MURPHY, ELEMENTS
OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). See also, PRITCHETr, CONGRESS VRSES
THE. SUPREME COURT (1962); cf. ScHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
(1960).
8 KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 135-36
(1965).
[Vol. 45
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He then goes on to try and apply this to the court system and con-
cludes that, in fact, the judicial structure presents "additional"
problems. For instance, he states as an example of this:
Patent administrators have refused to -respond to cues from the
Court to raise their standards of originality in the granting of
patents. Of course, they do comply in specific cases to avoid de-
fying the Court directly, but they have made no move to change
their general policy. An active Court concerned with more press-
ing problems than the Patent Office has necessarily conceded
the de facto power of the agency to pursue its own course; the
Court simply cannot give this question sufficient priority to force
its own will. Reliance upon legitimacy and psychological fac-
tors of authority here having proven inadequate, the Court has
not chosen to exercise its authority to intensify the effects of
the sanctions involved and increase the costs of defiance.39
The extra problem being that in the court system, sanctions against
subordinates can only occur subsequently and indirectly-when, and
if, a case is started and appealed.
While there is still much to be done in this area, the door is
ajar and political science is on its way in.
The major thrust of this section has been an attempt to dem-
onstrate that political analysis of judicial phenomena is (1) not
antagonistic to law school presuppositions about the judicial process
and the law and, indeed, is (2) helpful to guide the modern lawyer
in his understanding of his role as a lawyer and of the court's role
in the political system. To avoid coping with this type of material
is to avoid focussing upon an important aspect of the courts' opera-
tions, problems and functions in modem society.
Finally, there is a newly emergent field in the political scientific
study of the judiciary which should be of interest to those engaged in
general legal education and to those engaged in the study of juris-
prudence. This new area might be termed "comparative judicial
politics." It is simply an attempt to broaden our understanding of the
interactions between courts and politics to something beyond a
limited comprehension of the American variation. In addition, one
can question seriously the ability of anyone to comprehend any single
phenomenon without an opportunity to compare it with dissimilar
ones within its own class. After all, it is precisely the assumption
that comparison is prerequisite for fuller and better understanding
8 1 Id. at 137.
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that justifies interests in comparative law and in the comparison of
diverse jurisprudential systems of thought.
Moreover, this particular phase in the development of political
scientific jurisprudence is most closely related to the normative heart
of traditional legal philosophy. Concomitantly, it is this work
which is most apt to raise the dander of some jurisprudents. It is
doubtful that the practitioners of comparative judicial politics can
escape the fate of having their study (whether simple description or
the testing of multiple hypotheses) related to structural-functional
analysis. And this is, of course, unabashed positivism; it is the
asking of the social scientific "ought question," i.e., whether a par-
ticular variable (court system, court procedure, law, etc.) is func-
tional; whether it contributes towards growth or maintenance of the
living, developing social system. But although there is similarity,
then, in some of the higher level concerns of jurisprudence and
comparative judicial politics insofar as they discuss what ought to
be, there is still an exclusive normative preserve for jurisprudence
and a definite empirical use to which the scientists can be put by
jurisprudents. As Shapiro has observed:
Until political philosophy revives sufficiently to provide us with
a set of ultimate truths or a reasonable facsimile thereof, juris-
prudence is likely to concern itself with more immediate ques-
tions. There is a whole range of intermediate ought problems
that we must solve now even though our ultimates are shaky.
Ought property owners be forced to sell to Negroes? Ought
competitive sectors of the economy be allowed to become oligo-
polistic? Ought the jurisdiction of juvenile courts be extended?
If political jurisprudence provides us with some information on
the functions of lawmakers in our society, and in the process
prods those lawmakers into conscious political evaluation of their
own governmental roles and the role of government in general,
it will have contributed as much and perhaps more to the valua-
tional aspects of jurisprudence as its contemporaries. 4°
At this point, a quick rundown as to what has been done, is being
done, and what will probably be done in due course in comparative
judicial politics might be helpful.
Unfortunately, the total output of work of comparative judicial
politics to date is not very impressive. Purists might wish to trace
the start of the movement to Wigmore's classic work on legal sys-
, Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.J. 294, 343 (1964).
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tems.4 ' However, there are significant differences between those
tomes and the new political scientific studies along these general
lines. Mainly, the contemporary work attempts to frame and test
hypotheses-and there are efforts made to make the conceptualiza-
tion precise and to seek data subjectable to statistical analysis and
inter-subjective verification.
Two of the first theoretical works appeared in 1962. One, an
article by Nagel, was an attempt to formulate a conceptual scheme
that included some general cultural and adjudication characteristics
of ten societies.4" More specifically, he was trying to see whether
any relationship exists between "cultural characteristics" such as
(1) manufacturing economy vs. non-manufacturing economy; (2)
mainly dictatorial political system vs. mainly democratic political
system; and (3) collective property system vs. individualistic prop-
erty system; and "adjudication characteristics" such as (1) presence
of professional judges or dispute settlers; (2) mainly rigid prec-
edent following vs. mainly case individualization; and (3) mainly
defense oriented criminal procedure vs. mainly prosecution oriented
procedure. The other, a book by Abraham, was far more descriptive
and historical in its approach than the Nagel work, nonetheless it
too set forth many hypotheses that begged for further cross-cultural
study along the lines of the functions of judicial independence, and the
like.4" The common bond between these two works is a certain
heurism resulting from the formulation of their categories and their
open-ended, research oriented cross-cultural approach.
Almost simultaneously, but from across the Pacific, came the
first published attempt on the part of a non-American scholar to
carry out a political behavioral study of a non-American court.
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Hayakawa's study is a Guttman Scalogram analysis of the Japanese
Supreme Court which was stimulated directly by Schubert's early
work. And, unfortunately, Hayakawa makes the same basic error
in interpretation of the data that is frequently made and that is
often irksome to legal scholars.4 5 However, several other highly
"WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS (1936).
"2 Nagel, Culture Patterns and Judicial Systenzs, 16 VAND. L. REv. 147
(1962).
'3 ABRAHAM, THE JTrDIciAL PROCESS (1962).
"Hayakawa, Legal Systems and Judicial Behavior-With Particular
Reference to Civil Liberties in the Japantese Supreme Court, 2 KOBE U.L.
REv. 1 (1962).
" After all, Hayakawa states, id. at 22, that "A glance at the [Scalogram]
Table is sufficient to discover the impressive consistency of judicial atti-
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quantitative studies of foreign courts by foreign scholars (also at-
tributable to Schubertian influence) have been characterized by
designs that avoid such an analytic pitfall and that simply attempt
to correlate various extra-judicial factors with certain types of
judicial decisions. They have avoided the temptation to rely ex-
clusively on the judicial vote as a data source. In 1963, for instance,
Aubert studied the relationship between geographic, religious and
occupational variations and either conviction or acquittal of con-
scientious objectors in Norway. 6 His major finding was that the
study suggested "that different judges' dissimilar views of a problem
can lead to varying court decisions.14 7 This seems to be Samonte's
conclusion as well in a comparative study done on the Philippine
Supreme Court.4" And, in essence this is a similar finding in Danel-
ski's exploration of the Japanese Supreme Court, where he stated:
"In interviews with retired justices and high court judges the im-
portance of this period of modern Japanese history often came up,
especially in regard to the genesis of their liberal ideas which, in some
cases, they wrote in Supreme Court opinions." '49
Thus, it should be clear that most of the political behavioral work
done up to now on foreign courts has been concerned chiefly with
the psychic components of the decision-making process-with little
emphasis on judicial role aspects of the process." But I think that a
tudinal patterns." But, as I (and others) have observed elsewhere, the
Guttman Scalogram is interpretable as manifesting attitudinal patterns
only as responses to attitude questionnaires (from where the technique was
developed). A judicial opinion can hardly be considered to be the equivalent
of an answer (a response) to a questionnaire. See BECKER, POLITICAL
BEHAVIORALISAI AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE (1964). Also, for a most
recent example of the irritations felt by some legal scholars at the Schubert
approach, see Rosenthal Book Review, 81 PoL. Sci. Q. 448 (1966).
"Aubert, Conscientious Objectors Before Norwegian Military Courts,
in JUDICIAL DECISIONq MAKING 201 (Schubert ed. 1963).
7 Id. at 218.
"Paper by Abelardo Samonte, "The Philippines and the American Su-
preme Courts," presented APSA National Convention in New York City,
Sept. 1966.
"Paper by David J. Danelski, "The Supreme Court of Japan: An Ex-
ploratory Study," presented APSA National Convention in New York City,
Sept. 1966.
"0 But, Victor E. Flango is currently evaluating data gathered on some
55 Philippine judges in a study based on the questionnaire used in my study
of the Hawaiian judiciary. Donald Kommers is also emphasizing the con-
cept of the judicial role in his current study of the German Constitutional
Court. Danelski has also collected much information on the Japanese
judges' conception of judicial role, but that too has yet to be published,
though it will be discussed in the relevant sections of my forthcoming book,
Comparative Judicial Politics.
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breakthrough is imminent into a new surge of judicial behavioral
research on foreign judiciaries that will be based on and spurred
by a reliance upon a structural/functional analytic framework. Ques-
tions along the lines of: the political functions, judicial review, de-
grees of judicial independence, variations in allowing popular par-
ticipation in judicial proceedings (the jury vs. the Soviet obchestven-
nost), etc. can be studied in a new light from this perspective. By
this we will be returning to the attempt to find answers to the key
questions of the justification of our court system and procedures.
This time, however, we will have empirical information gathered
with system and rigor. It would be a shame if the law schools felt
that this information was of no concern to them-because, once
again, it is of so much concern to the entire political and legal
system.
There is scarcely a wide gap, if indeed any at all, between ma-
terials relevant to political scientists interested in courts and those
materials relevant to legal scholars in general and jurisprudents in
particular. 51 Yet, this kinship of interest has not been accurately
perceived by those travelling in the legal circles. On the other hand,
some in those circles seem to feel that it is the behavioral scientists
who are missing the connection. For instance, Judge Santo recently
wrote in the newsletter of the Law and Society Association:
• . . but the lawyers need a scientific inquiry into the tensions
and strains leading to change within the judicial system, as well
as an evaluation of accomplished change, and some predictability
as to contemplated change. I have heretofore detected resistence
to entering this field of inquiry on behalf of the behavioral
sciences .... 52
No matter who is to blame, past misunderstandings need not be
perpetuated.
I have tried to identify the community of interest. In other
words, I have tried to show that a field aptly called Political Scien-
tific Jurisprudence exists. Thus I suggest that a course by this name
belongs in the curriculum of law schools. This course would in-
clude the growing body of knowledge as well as a methodology of
" This is the general drift of the argument in Nagel, "Jurisprudence,
Sociology of Law, and Political Science: Some Comments on Jones' 'View
from the Bridge,'" Newsletter of the Law and Society Association (July
196 5 Santo, "Sociology of the Law and the Judicial System," Newsletter
of the Law and Society Association 30 (July 1966).
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research and analysis. I am suggesting that it belongs in the law
school curriculum explicitly. But I am suggesting as well that law
students also be trained implicitly to think in terms of the inter-
action of courts, politics, and law, and be further exposed to social
scientific methods and techniques. This would be consistent with,
and supplementary to, the students' training to think of the so-
cial and economic causes of the changes in law they study through
their case materials-and of the effect of such laws upon the social
system. I submit that there is no less reason to make potential
lawyers aware of the political causes and effects of litigation and
judicial decisions. To think otherwise would be to assert that
feigned ignorance of politics is good for the development of case law.
We have certainly advanced beyond the point of believing that the
randomized, uncontrolled, and misunderstood forces of society are
better for the development of law than systematizing our knowledge
about it. Why any less for the political factor? We can never assess
the role of politics in the practice of law or judgeship by avoiding
systematic inquiry and study. Such is the need for Political Scien-
tific Jurisprudence in the modern law school curriculum.
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